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ABSTRACT 
Non-Binding Minimum Taxes May Foster Tax Competition   
by Kai A. Konrad * 
In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing 
a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the 
non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.   
 
Keywords: Corporate income, capital income, taxation, tax competition, minimum tax, 
tax coordination, Stackelberg 
JEL Classification: H87 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Mindeststeuern können Steuerwettbewerb verstärken  
Diese Arbeit untersucht Steuerwettbewerb als Stackelberg-Spiel. Als zentrales 
Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass die Einführung einer unteren Grenze für die Höhe der 
von Ländern wählbaren Steuersätzen zu einer Senkung der Steuersätze im 
Gleichgewicht führen kann. Die politisch häufig geforderte Einführung von 
Mindeststeuersätzen im Bereich der internationalen Kapitalbesteuerung kann 
also im Vergleich zur angestrebten Wirkung genau die gegenteiligen Effekte 
haben. 
 
                                                 
*   I thank Marie-Laure Breuillé, Clemens Fuest, Tim Goodspeed, Andreas Haufler, Peter Birch Sørensen 
and Tanguy van Ypersele for comments. The usual caveat applies.   
 
 1 Introduction
Europe is currently facing a period of strong corporate income tax competi-
tion. Multinationals can, by various means, easily relocate their accounting
proﬁts to low-tax countries inside the EU. Policy makers sometimes articu-
late concern that a downward adjustment of their own tax rates may initiate
further tax rate cuts inside the European union, which suggests that they
feel that they are operating in a sequential, leader-follower game.1 Agree-
ments on minimum taxes for capital income at source and corporate income
taxation have been proposed by experts (see, e.g., the report by the Ruding
Committee 1992, p. 202). However, despite the fears that a downward spiral
in the eﬀective corporate tax rates in Europe will continue, such a minimum
tax rate on corporate income has not been implemented, not even at a level
that is lower than the tax rates chosen by the countries in an uncoordinated
equilibrium.
Am i n i m u mt a xr a t et h a ti sa b o v et h es m a l l e s tt a xr a t ec h o s e ni n s i d et h e
EU has redistributional eﬀects and thus makes minimum tax arrangements
diﬃcult to attain (see, e.g., Peralta and van Ypersele 2006). A minimum tax
that is lower than the lowest observed tax rates in the union has not been
discussed, perhaps because it is believed that such a constraint would have
no eﬀect. However, this intuition is misleading. A minimum tax rate that
is lower than the lowest tax rate in the unconstrained equilibrium may have
strong strategic eﬀects. I show that it may induce all countries to make their
tax rates lower than those they choose in the unconstrained equilibrium.
A comprehensive survey of capital tax competition is that of Fuest, Huber
and Mintz (2005) who also discuss the literature on a number of aspects of
1See, e.g., Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) for empirical evidence suggesting that coun-
tries react to tax rate changes in other countries.
1minimum taxes on capital income at source. Minimum taxes have also been
considered in the context of value added taxes and cross-border shopping
(e.g., Kanbur and Keen 1998, Wang 1999, Hvidt and Nielsen 2001). Wang
(1999) is closest to the current paper and it also reveals strategic implications
of minimum taxes that emerge in a Stackelberg framework. Apart from
addressing commodity taxation and cross-border shopping instead of taxes
o nc a p i t a li n c o m ea ts o u r c e ,am a j o rd i ﬀerence is that he considers minimum
taxes that are binding in the unconstrained Stackelberg equilibrium in the
sense that the minimum tax is strictly higher than the lowest tax rate that
emerges in the unconstrained Stackelberg equilibrium, while in this paper I
consider a minimum tax that is strictly lower than all tax rates that emerge
in the unconstrained Stackelberg equilibrium. Wong ﬁnds that the country
with the higher tax rate may adjust its equilibrium tax rate downwards as
a result of the minimum tax. I ﬁnd that all countries may reduce their tax
rates as an implication of the introduction of a minimum tax.
2T h e A n a l y s i s
Consider a reduced form of capital income tax competition at source. Two
countries L and F compete by their choices of tax rates tL and tF, respec-
tively, with ti ∈ [0,1] for i ∈ {L,F}, where the tax rates chosen have the stan-
dard implications for the equilibrium allocation of capital, tax revenues and
the distribution of capital income. Countries’ payoﬀsa r ef u n c t i o n so fb o t h
tax rates and deﬁned as πL(tL,t F) and πF(tL,t F). Let these functions be con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable and strictly quasi-concave in ti and tj, implying that
the iso-payoﬀ curves are convex to the origin. Let argmaxti∈[0,1]{πi(ti,t j)} ∈
(0,1) be single-valued for all tj ∈ [0,1] and increasing in the other country’s
tax rate. This implies that the reaction correspondences determining i’s opti-
2mal tax rate choices for a given tax rate of j are single-valued, upward sloping
throughout2 and can be written as functions tL(tF) and tF(tL) respectively,
with ti(tj) ∈ (0,1) for all tj ∈ [0,1]. The reaction functions and some repre-
sentatives of the set of iso-payoﬀ functions are depicted in Figure 1. A Nash
equilibrium N is characterized by an intersection of the reaction functions as
in Figure 1. A ﬁnal assumption is that this equilibrium is unique. Together
with the previous assumptions, this implies that tF(tL) intersects tL(tF) for
tax rates in the interior of (0,1) × (0,1) and from the upper left at N.
Consider now sequential games in which country L acts as a Stackelberg
leader and chooses its tax rate ﬁrst, and F behaves as a follower. This se-
quencing of tax rate choices is exogenous here, but could be endogenized
along the reasoning in Hamilton and Slutzky (1990). By a choice of tL the
leader L can choose any combination of taxes (tL,t F(tL)) along the reaction
2Upward sloping reaction functions in the context of capital income taxation are also
empirically conﬁrmed, e.g., by Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002).




L ≡ arg max
tL∈[0,1]





In Figure 1 each tax rate combination is mapped into a pair of countries’
payoﬀs, for the whole area of possible tax combinations. The point S is
identiﬁed as the point for which L attains the highest payoﬀ πL from all
points (tL,t F(tL)) along F’s reaction curve. This point is either an interior
point such as S, or a corner solution at S0.A stF(tL) need not be concave, the
Stackelberg equilibrium also does not need to be unique. I concentrate on the
case of an interior Stackelberg equilibrium such as S, but the argument that
is made about the introduction of a minimum tax also applies for a corner
equilibrium such as S0. The Stackelberg equilibrium is generically unique in
this framework, but the proof of the main result in this paper also works in
the case of multiple Stackelberg equilibria.
Note that S =( tS
L,t S
F) is necessarily to the upper right of N:t h ei s o -
payoﬀ curve ¯ πL(N) has a slope of zero at the Nash equilibrium N,a st h i s
point is on L’s reaction function tL(tF). Accordingly, this iso-payoﬀ curve
intersects tF(tL) at N from the upper left to the lower right. By continuity
and quasi-concavity, this yields a lower payoﬀ than in N for all tax rate
combinations along tF(tL) on the lower left to N, and a whole set of tax rate
combinations along tF(tL) to the upper right of N need to have higher payoﬀ
than ¯ πL(N) for L by the continuity properties of the payoﬀ function πL.
So far this characterizes the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium in a re-
duced form of a standard tax competition framework. Suppose now that L
and F, for some reason outside the scope of this analysis, are subject to a
minimum tax constraint. Both countries choose their tax rates freely, but
cannot choose a tax rate lower than some minimum tax rate t0 > 0, i.e.,
ti ∈ [t0,1] for both i ∈ {L,F}. The two countries choose their tax rates
4according to the rules of the Stackelberg game that has been outlined above,
with the only diﬀerence that they choose their taxes from this more con-
strained interval [t0,1]. I call the respective game the constrained Stackelberg
game. The following main result can be stated:
Proposition 1 Let (tS
L,t S
F) be the Stackelberg equilibrium in the unconstrained
game, and let tS
L ≥ tS
F.A m i n i m u m t a x r a t e t0 <t S
F exists such that the
Stackelberg equilibrium in the constrained game has lower tax rates for both
countries L and F than in the unconstrained game.
Proof. Let (1) characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium in the unconstrained
case; in the case of multiple equilibria, consider the equilibrium with the
lowest tax rates. Consider a minimum tax rate t0 = tS
F −  ,f o r >0.T h i s
minimum tax rate changes the optimal reply functions of both countries to
ˆ ti(tj)=
(
ti(tj) for ti(tj) >t S
F −  
tS
F −   for ti(tj) ≤ tS
F −  
for i,j ∈ {L,F} and i 6= j. (2)
T h ec h o i c eo fˆ ti(tj)=t0 for ti(tj) <t 0 follows from the properties of the
payoﬀ functions: for a given tj,p a y o ﬀ of country i increases if it changes its
tax rate towards the unconstrained optimum ti(tj). Figure 2 depicts the reply
functions ˆ tF(tL) and ˆ tL(tF) as the solid lines. These coincide with the reply
functions in the unconstrained case for all unconstrained optimal replies that
are higher than the minimum tax t0 and are equal to t0 for all smaller tax
rates ti(tj). A Stackelberg equilibrium is characterized by
t
0
L ≡ arg max
tL∈[t0,tS
L]
{πL(tL,ˆ tF(tL))} and t
0
F ≡ ˆ tF(t
0
L).( 3 )
The upper limit tS
L in tL ∈ [t0,t S
L] can be adopted, because, by (1), tS
L is
optimal for L among all tL ∈ [tS
L,1].
5Consider now   → 0. The iso-payoﬀ curve ¯ πL that passes through S
has a strictly positive slope at S.F o r s u ﬃciently small but positive   this
iso-payoﬀ curve intersects ˆ tF(tL) to the left of S,b u tf o rav a l u eo ftL >t 0.
The latter follows from the assumption that tS
L ≥ tS
F >t 0 and   → 0.T h e
choice t0
L in (3) is therefore given by
ˆ tL(t0)=m a x {t0,t L(t0)}.( 4 )
T h eF i g u r e2 ad e p i c t st h ec a s ew i t hˆ tL(t0)=tL(t0), Figure 2b depicts the case
with ˆ tL(t0)=t0.N o w ,f o r  → 0, it follows that t0
F = t0 = tS
F −  <t S
F and
t0
L =m a x {t0,t L(t0)} <t S




F) by t0 <t S
F and by tL(tF) being strictly monotonically
increasing.
Proposition 1 shows that tax coordination that limits the choices of tax
rates from below by a minimum tax that is smaller than any of the tax rates
6that are chosen in the laissez-faire equilibrium can reduce the equilibrium tax
rates of all countries to below their unconstrained laissez-faire equilibrium
levels. Note also that the leader could gain and the follower would lose from
the introduction of such a minimum tax.3 Intuitively, tax rates are strategic
complements. If the Stackelberg leader were to reduce his tax rate compared
to tS
L in the unconstrained Stackelberg equilibrium, the follower would react
by a reduction of his tax rate. This reduction is unpleasant for the leader.
However, if the minimum tax is only slightly below the tax chosen by the
follower in the unconstrained equilibrium and the leader reduces his tax, the
follower would like to reduce his tax, but the scope for such a reduction is
very limited. The follower cannot reduce his tax to below the minimum tax.
Hence, if the leader cuts his own tax rate substantially, he need not fear that
there will also be a large unpleasant strategic reaction by the follower, as the
follower’s scope for a tax cut is limited. The follower’s tax rate is lowered
only a little bit, down to the minimum tax rate. In the new equilibrium the
follower would prefer to have an even smaller tax rate, but is constrained
by the minimum tax, whereas the leader chooses the optimal reply to this
minimum tax among the feasible replies.
3C o n c l u s i o n s
The discussion here shows that constraints in the tax rate choice sets of coun-
tries that do not prohibit the choice of both countries’ equilibrium actions in
the unconstrained problem may still strongly aﬀect the equilibrium outcome.
A lower bound on tax rates that is lower than the one any of the countries
would have chosen in the unconstrained equilibrium can induce an equilib-
3The follower’s payoﬀ at ˆ S is lower than at the intersection of a vertical line through
ˆ S with tF(tS),a n dh i sp a y o ﬀ there is lower than at S.
7rium in which all countries choose a lower tax rate than in the unconstrained
equilibrium.
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